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SYMPOSIUM: ETHICAL GUIDE-
LINES ON ATTORNEY-CLIENT
CONFIDENTIALITY
SYMPATHY FOR THE DEVIL?:
REFLECTIONS ON THE CRIME-FRAUD
EXCEPTION TO CLIENT
CONFIDENTIALITY*
DAVID S. CAUDILL**
The practice of law as we know it requires the much discussed
division between legal or constructive ethics and nonlegal or ac-
tual ethics. A lawyer need not act like a good citizen if doing so
would, for example, breach a client's trust. The ongoing investiga-
tions into the savings and loan industry and into the roles played
by attorneys who represented now-failed institutions highlight
this division between good lawyers and good people in the field of
ethics. When the question is raised in these investigations as to
* Except for slight modifications, these remarks were delivered as the 18th Annual
Legal Ethics Institute lecture, November 6, 1992, at Washington & Lee University,
Lexington, Virginia.
** David Caudill, B.A., J.D., Ph.D., is Assistant Professor of Law, Washington & Lee
University School of Law.
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whether banking lawyers should have recognized the point at
which they had a duty to nonclients (i.e., to courts, agencies, third
parties, and opposing counsel), the duty of confidentiality usually
functions as constructive ethics and the duty to disclose begins to
look like actual ethics. While this may seem an opportune time to
reintroduce or revitalize moral reflection in law, I think that the
practicing bar will make every effort to keep disclosure duties well
within the constructive ethics of law, primarily because the stakes
nowadays are so high. Just when the public wants good citizens,
lawyers see expanded liability for moral reflection outside the
rules of professional responsibility.
This Article briefly considers the tension between constructive
and actual ethics as it appears: in the confusion of law students;
in academician and lawyer jokes; in Voltaire; in Professor Tom
Shaffer's moral reflections; in the ABA Model Rules (adopted gen-
erally in about two-thirds of the states, although very few states
adopt its confidentiality provisions); in the Virginia Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility ("Virginia Code"), which like most states'
rules on confidentiality contrasts with the ABA Model Rules ap-
proach; in savings and loan litigation; and, of course, in Kafka. I
have no solution,' but I hope to clarify, for those who criticize legal
ethics on the basis of actual ethics, a barrier they must face.
When I chose the title Sympathy for the Devil?, I was thinking
about the question of whether we ought to feel sorry for attorneys
who choose, in the name of client confidentiality, not to disclose
client fraud, especially if they suffer ethical sanctions or liability
to third parties for that choice. 2 My concern is not with sympathy
as an appropriate psychological response, but rather whether the
rules of professional responsibility or the principles of legal ethics
surrounding those rules or both, provide sufficient guidance to at-
torneys who suspect fraudulent activities on the part of their cli-
ents. In other words, if an attorney faces ethical sanctions or lia-
1 See generally Kenneth J. Drexler, Honest Attorneys, Crooked Clients and Innocent
Third Parties: A Case for More Disclosure, 6 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHics 393 (1992) (proposes a
disclosure option); Lonnie Kocontes, Client Confidentiality and the Crooked Client: Why
Silence Is Not Golden, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHmics 283 (1992) (proposing mandatory disclosure
scheme).
2 See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral Inquiry
Into Lawyers'Responsibility for Client Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REV. 75 (1993) (giving a behav-
ioral and psychological account of why attorneys might not recognize clients' wrongdoing as
wrong, and discussing cognitive bias or illusions, wishful thinking, blind spots, group (at-
torney-team) dynamics, and other explanations for lack of awareness).
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bility to third parties for failure to report client fraud, should we
join the current trends of legal scholarship and of the courts in
condemning him or her, or should we view that individual as
caught within a confusing web of inconsistent guidelines and con-
flicting duties, of dangerous line-drawing and expensive moral
introspection?
The tension between the rule of client confidentiality and the
rule requiring disclosure of a client's intention to commit a crime
or fraud is well-known-it involves a clash between two recog-
nized duties of a lawyer.' The two "dialectical" rules are particu-
larly challenging to law students, because client confidentiality is
paramount to the attorney-client relationship. In Virginia, for ex-
ample, you do not reveal past illegal conduct, but you may reveal
client confidences if the client consents, or if the court requires
you to do so, or if the client acknowledges a fraud has been com-
mitted on a third party. Further, you must reveal a client's stated
intention to commit a crime if you can't talk the client out of it;
and, finally, you must reveal a fraud on a tribunal. 4 These so-
called crime-fraud exceptions to the duty of confidentiality can be
confusing, and recent law school graduates studying for the Vir-
ginia bar exam are often afraid they will get the ethics questions
wrong. Hypothetically, they are afraid they will be good citizens
and end up not being good advccates, or that they will try to pro-
tect their clients' interests and end up getting arrested or sued. If
such fears drive a graduate outside Virginia, he or she will dis-
cover the persistent lack of uniformity among state bars regarding
disclosure options and duties. Nevertheless, while some states'
rules are less complicated, the dialectical tension between client
confidentiality and disclosure of client fraud is inescapable.
Of course, unresolvable tensions abound in the law, generally
between conflicting social policies, between individual and com-
munity rights, and between formalism and ad hoc balancing.
These tensions recur in judicial opinions in every specific field,
sub-discipline, or practice-area of the law. Moreover, even though
the practicing bar and legal educators have paid more and more
attention to professional responsibility over the past ten to fifteen
3 See generally Drexler, supra note 1, at 394-403 (tracing history of organized bars' at-
tempts to balance the two rules).
4 VA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1992); VA. CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102 (1992).
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years, the field of legal ethics has always been viewed with some
disdain by law professors and by law students.5 Professional Re-
sponsibility is a required course for law students, that's bad; it is
another Continuing Legal Education burden on practitioners,6
that's bad. And in any event, it was not traditionally considered
an exciting field of law.7
During the past two years, however, things changed. Two
trends in the field of professional responsibility have captured the
minds of attorneys and the attention of the national media: first,
the trend toward viewing ethical codes as a basis of civil liability;
and second, the trend toward expansive disclosure duties on attor-
neys. While neither trend is new, they intersected rather dramat-
ically in the New York City offices of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman,
Hays & Handler ("Kaye, Scholer"). Kaye, Scholer, one of the law
firms that represented Lincoln Savings and Loan Association
whose failure cost taxpayers $2.6 billion,' was sued by the Office
of Thrift Supervision for $275 million and the firm's assets were
frozen. Many lawyers in the firm believed the accusation that its
lawyers had participated in false reporting to regulatory authori-
ties was insupportable because of the rules of client confidential-
ity;9 but nonetheless the firm settled for $41 million after only six
days-"six turbulent days that shook the legal world."10 The im-
pact on the legal community was immediate. The ABA Journal in
July 1992 made the Kaye, Scholer controversy its cover story, de-
voting eleven pages to the question of whether lawyers should be
5 See William H. Simon, The Trouble with Legal Ethics, 41 J. LEGAL EDuc. 65 (1991). "At
most law schools, students find the course in legal ethics or professional responsibility bor-
ing and insubstantial, and faculty dread having to teach it." Id. at 65.
6 See Fax Poll, CAL. LAWYER, Mar. 1993, at 108, 108 (in recent fax poll, 79% of 565 prac-
tioners responding did not favor mandatory continuing legal education, and 89% did not
think Continuing Legal Education programs would diminish incompetent or unethical
lawyering).
7 See Simon, supra note 5, at 65 ("From afar, it seems exciting .... But close up, legal
ethics usually turns out to be dull and dispiriting.").
8 See Sharon Walsh, D.C. Lawyer is Fined in S & L Failure: $600,000 Penalty Set for
Linclon Opinion, WASH. PosT, May 23, 1992, at Al.
9 See Rita Henley Jensen, Kaye Scholer's Lincoln Woes, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 16, 1992, at 1,
32. A significant feature of the Kaye, Scholer affair, beyond the scope of these remarks, is
the question of whether attorneys engaged in regulatory compliance work are in an adver-
sarial mode, for example, when responding to investigative inquiries of the regulatory au-
thority. See generally Robert G. Day, Administrative Watchdogs or Zealous Advocates? Im-
plications for Legal Ethics in the Face of Expanded Attorney Liability, 45 STAN. L. REV. 645,
659-69 (1993).
10 Stephanie B. Goldberg, Welcome to the New Uncertainty, A.B.A. J., July 1992, at 50,
51.
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responsible for client fraud when lawyers were aware of but chose
not to disclose the fraud. ABA committees are now in place to
study the rules and to provide guidance in this area.11
As to the trend toward using ethical codes as a basis for civil
liability, e.g., as a standard for lawyer malpractice,' 2 the ABA
Center for Professional Responsibility has been monitoring recent
judicial opinions.'" In 1991, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit in Schatz v. Rosenburg'4 held to the old line, which was
written into the "scope" section of the ABA Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, that the ethical duty of disclosure does not
create a legal duty.'5 Thus, in Schatz, the possibility of an ethical
violation did not affect the court's finding of no securities fraud.' 6
But that very same year, the Seventh Circuit in Ackerman v.
Schwartz17 weakened the distinction between ethical and "legal"
duties, making the attorney in a tax opinion matter responsible
for losses caused by misstatements.' 8
Along these lines, two recent 1992 Illinois state court opinions,
Rutledge v. St. Ann's Hospital'9 and Mayol v. Summers, Watson &
Kimpel,2 ° applied the rules of professional responsibility as stan-
dards of conduct for determining lawyer malpractice liability. In
addition, a California court in Mirabito v. Liccardo2 ' used the eth-
ical code as a standard of care; and while the Washington State
Supreme Court in Hizey v. Carpenter22 explicitly refused to follow
that trend, the court nonetheless suggested that use of ethical
11 See Nancy Cowger Slonim, The A.B.A Responds, A.B.A. J., July 1992, at 61.
12 See generally Emily Courie, The Tangled Web: When Ethical Misconduct Becomes
Legal Liability, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1993, at 64-68.
13 See Joanne Pitulla, Law Firm Liability for Client Fraud: Distinguishing Between
Legal and Ethical Standards, PROF. LAw., May 1992, at 8; Cornelia Honchar Tuite, Ethical
Rules Can Determine Standard of Care, PROF. LAW., Aug. 1992, at 10; Ethics Rules Don't
Prove Malpractice, PROF. LAw., Aug. 1992, at 21. The Professional Lawyer, the newsletter of
the Special Coordinating Committee on Professionalism at the A.B.A. Center for Profes-
sional Responsibility, includes "case updates" in each issue.
14 943 F.2d 485 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1475 (1992).
15 Id. at 493 (ethics violation does not create civil liability).
16 Id. at 498 (no breach of securities laws).
17 947 F.2d 841, 846 (7th Cir. 1991).
18 Id. at 846 (there exists legal duty that information relating to securities be accurate).
19 595 N.E.2d 1165, 1171 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (involving attorney's violation of rules of
adversarial system).
20 585 N.E.2d 1176, 1186-88 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (rules used to instruct jury).
21 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 571, 573 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (attorney's duties are governed by the
rules of professional conduct).
22 830 P.2d 646, 654 (Wash. 1992) (expert witness referred to general ethical require-
ments but legal duty governed).
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principles without reference to the code might work.23 That is, the
standard of care in malpractice cases may be the same as the ethi-
cal code, but the code alone does not establish that standard, so
the Washington court seemed to join the trend toward liability
here identified.24
The other trend or aspect of this trend, namely the growing ex-
ception to client confidentiality for client fraud, was addressed in
the Spring of 1992 at Washington & Lee University in the annual
securities law lecture by Richard Phillips.25 He confirmed that the
issue is a matter of hot debate among securities regulators and
practitioners.26 I agree that the dilemma is not just a matter of
responding calmly and rationally-for example, by tinkering with
the language of the code-to inevitable changes in the profession.
Rather, this is an area where many of the proposed solutions seem
to cause additional problems. Briefly, if expansive exceptions to
the rule of confidentiality are created, lawyer-client relations will
suffer and one of the foundations of lawyering as we know it will
begin to collapse. But I don't want to exaggerate an everyday or
run-of-the-mill problem. If we say that there are good arguments
for changes in legal ethics and good arguments for resisting those
changes, that is a fairly accurate description of every significant
legal problem or controversy among lawyers.
As you know, academicians are often accused of spending their
lives on trivial matters. Long articles and books are written on
the smallest details of history and politics and literature, and we
joke about this obsession with the seemingly irrelevant. There is
a story about the police department in a small town in Colorado,
which hired a Ph.D. in ancient philosophy as a police officer. He
turned out to be an outstanding member of the force. So, when
another position opened up, the police department ran an ad in a
philosophy journal. It read: WANTED: MEDIEVAL PHILOSO-
PHY PH.D. FOR POLICE OFFICER. The editors of the journal
23 Id.
24 Id. (court balanced between legal duty and ethical precepts).
25 See Richard M. Phillips, Client Fraud and the Securities Lawyer's Duty of Confidenti-
ality, 49 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 823 (1992) (stating that attorneys have greater duty to pre-
vent fraud in situations involving financial transactions).
26 See generally Day, supra note 9, at 669-86 (discussing whether an attorney's duty has
been altered by the Remedies Act of 1990).
27 See Kocontes, supra note 1, at 288-89 (critical discussion of arguments for and against
greater disclosure duties, including a challenge to presumption that more disclosure will
severely affect lawyer-client relations).
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called the police chief and asked: "Why a philosopher?" The police
chief told the editor of the success of the earlier hire. Then the
editors asked: "Why medieval philosophy?," and the chief replied:
"We already have somebody in ancient." The curricular joke, of
course, is on philosophers. Who really cares about the details of
ancient and medieval philosophy?
There is another story about a linguistics conference, where a
speaker was explaining the analogy between language and mathe-
matical logic. While he was arguing strongly for the proposition
that two positive assertions in language, like two positive num-
bers, can never create a negative implication, someone in the back
of the room said dismissively: "Yeah, yeah .... .
We joke about the self-importance of academicians. We don't
feel sympathy for their problems. In fact, when we do feel sympa-
thy for a certain class of people, we find jokes about them particu-
larly inappropriate. The political cartoonist Callahan, who is, in
common parlance, "disabled" is controversial because draws
cartoons about the "disabled." One of his cartoons portrays a
camel, in a wheel chair, on a television talk show. The talk show
host asks the camel: "Do you feel comfortable talking about the
straw?"
If the current industry in lawyer jokes tells us anything, it's
that lawyers are not sympathetic figures in society. There is a
story of two lawyers in Washington, D.C., who were classmates in
law school, but had not seen each other in a year when they met
on the street. One of them asked the other: "How's your practice
going?" The other replied: "Are you kidding?," and then explained
he had just finished winning a large case before the United States
Supreme Court, which resulted in his being recognized as attor-
ney of the year. When his friend said: "I'm amazed, I didn't know
things had been going so well," the successful attorney continued:
"My brief was published in the Harvard Law Review." His friend
said: "That's great, I'm sorry I didn't see it." The embarrassed
friend then asked: "Otherwise, you're O.K.?" The successful at-
torney replied: "Well, to be frank, I am a bit depressed because
yesterday I gave a jury argument without realizing my pants zip-
per was open." His friend then said: '"Yeah, I heard about that."
That joke combines a jab at attorneys generally with a specific ref-
erence to the triviality of what lawyers pay attention to.
Of course, making fun of lawyers and the law is not new. When
1993]
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the French philosopher Voltaire wrote his Philosophical Diction-
ary2" in 1764, which was not a dictionary at all but a collection of
satirical essays arranged alphabetically by topic, he included an
essay on law which is worth revisiting on the issue of triviality.
Voltaire recounts and reflects upon his own experience with the
law courts in eighteenth-century France. On one occasion, he lost
a lawsuit in Paris concerning some clothes made for him in India,
and upon losing, his lawyer told him that in another court in Paris
he would probably have won.29 Voltaire reflects: "That's very
funny [that] each court [in Paris] has its own law." His lawyer,
sensing an opportunity to entertain Voltaire even more, tells
Voltaire that in the nearby province of Normandy, the lawsuit
would have been easily won! Voltaire goes on with tongue-in-
cheek, in his essay, to praise the "wisdom" of a French law that
imprisons a shepherd for nine years for giving a little foreign salt
to his sheep.30 After all, we need to protect local salt producers.
He also praises the "just" result in a case involving his neighbor,
who cut down a tree in his own woods without knowing that the
action was illegal. The law was harsh, but after all we need to
protect the environment, even though the neighbor's wife died in
misery, and even though the neighbor's son, Voltaire observed,
"drags out a life unhappier than death."3 ' Suddenly, however, typ-
ical of Voltaire's essays, the mood changes when Voltaire talks
about laws that authorize war on neighboring regions; the slaugh-
ter of 100,000 people is not something to be joked about.3 2 The
little inconsistencies of the Parisian courts and the annoyances of
numerous unwise and unjust laws pale in comparison to the arbi-
trary and inhuman laws of war. We learn from Voltaire's critical
legal study that there are everyday problems that we should rec-
ognize, but that there are serious problems on which we should
spend our time.
There were echoes of Voltaire in Professor Tom Shaffer's No-
vember 1991 lecture to the Legal Ethics Institute.33 Professor
Shaffer began his presentation by trivializing the rules of profes-
28 VOLTAIRE, PHILOSOPHICAL DIcTIoNARY (T. Besterman trans. 1971).
29 Id. at 283-84.
30 Id. at 286.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 See Thomas L. Shaffer, There is More to Legal Ethics than Rules, 18 WASH. & LEE Soc.
REsP.: Bus., JOURNALISM, LAW, MED. 31 (1992).
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sional responsibility. The title of his lecture was There is More to
Legal Ethics Than Rules. In his lecture, Professor Shaffer wanted
to get beyond the rules themselves and reach the morals "around
and under the rules."34 For his departure point, an example of
mere rules, he chose the 1983 Virginia Code, which adopted the
"whistle-blower" rule,35 rather than the ABA model "mouthpiece"
rule, 6 on matters of client confidentiality. The "mouthpiece" rule
is exemplified in the ABA Model Rule 1.6(a): a lawyer shall not
reveal information relating to representation unless the client
consents, although a lawyer may reveal, but need not reveal, in-
formation to prevent a criminal act likely to result in imminent
death or substantial bodily harm.3 7 On the other hand, the Vir-
ginia rule states that a lawyer shall reveal the intention of a client
to commit a crime, any crime, after urging the client to desist and
advising that the planned crime will be reported unless the client
abandons the plan; fraud on a third party may be revealed-hence
the "whistle-blower" role for attorneys in Virginia. 8 In fact, the
Virginia rule expressly permits the attorney "to disregard the
duty of confidentiality if it is clearly established that the client is
using the lawyer to perpetuate a fraud or other crime.
Professor Shaffer reported that attorneys in attendance at the
Richmond conference on the new code in Virginia thought that the
new Virginia rule on crime disclosure was ridiculous and would
probably be evaded in practice.4 ° For example, if a client says she
will submit false tax documents, the client will probably promise
not to do it if the attorney threatens to turn her in, which Shaffer
notes relieves the attorney from the obligation to report even if the
attorney is convinced that the client will continue with the tax
fraud.4 1 Professor Shaffer pointed out that unless a client clearly
acknowledges a planned crime or fraud, the attorney is not free to
disclose the crime or fraud. This suggests that Virginia is playing
34 Id. at 31.
35 See VA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsmiLrrY DR 4-101(D) (1992).
36 See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCT Rule 1.6(a) (1992).
37 Id.
38 See VA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBiLTY DR 4-101(D) (1992). But see Phillips,
supra note 25, at 827-28 (most states do not follow the ABA "mouthpiece" rule). Neverthe-
less, many variations of the "whistle-blower" rule exist. See Drexiler, supra note 1, at 298-
301.
39 See Phillips, supra note 25, at 827-28.
40 See Shaffer, supra note 33, at 32. "One or two of those I talked to planned to respond
to it as a lawyer learns to respond to dumb rules: It is to be evaded." Id.
41 Id.
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games by placing the focus not on fraud but on admission of fraud,
as if an admitted fraud is an evil to be reported, but a fraud that a
client does not recognize or wishes to hide from her attorney is a
matter to be kept confidential.
Professor Shaffer used this example to illustrate that the rules
of ethics are not really guides to attorney conduct, since most at-
torneys will not report a client's stated intention to commit a
crime simply because the ethical rules require doing so. There is,
in fact, another "rule" or guideline having to do with trust, which
for many attorneys trumps the ethical rules except in cases of seri-
ous violations of the law. That is, trivial violations will simply not
be reported. This means that murder, mayhem, and widespread
securities fraud should be reported, but not plans to violate tax
laws, vehicular regulations, hunting laws, and plans for petty
theft from the grocery store. Child abuse, of course, goes on the
list of serious violations.4 2
But as Professor Shaffer points out, this division between seri-
ous and trivial violations is not in the Virginia Code; rather, it is a
moral distinction under and around the rules. An attorney might
need to betray client trust by reporting a serious crime, and cause
pain to herself and others, but that's part of being moral.4 3 I would
like to invert that principle and talk about the damage an attor-
ney might cause to both herself and her law firm if she, for moral
reasons, involving client trust, chooses not to disclose client fraud.
I would like to reconsider some recent cases involving lawyer
liability for client fraud, and also to look carefully at how the Vir-
ginia Code guides attorneys faced with fraudulent clients. We
might make a rough distinction in the field of legal ethics between
two different discourses or types of analyses. On the one hand, we
can view the rules of professional responsibility as a legal frame-
work having little to do with actual ethics except in the sense that
the rules do constitute an ethical system. That is, we can ac-
knowledge the rules reflect a set of ethical principles, but then fo-
cus on the rules as guidelines. Often professional responsibility
professors say: "I'm not going to teach ethics. I'm not going to ask
you whether you think the rules are right or wrong. I just want
you to learn the rules and follow them." These statements confirm
42 Id. at 33.
43 Id. at 34.
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a division between legal rules and ethical reflections. The latter
category, ethics, is trivialized or marginalized, and the rules are
elevated as determinative of behavior. The opposite view was re-
flected in Professor Shaffer's remarks when he stated: "There is
nothing the matter with rules. But there is something the matter
with the notion that our moral lives are determined by rules."4 4
For moral guidance, we must look under and around the rules, to
the religious foundations of the rules, and to the narratives of
lawyering in history and in our day. Without this context the
rules alone, like the rule that requires reporting any crime that a
client proposes to commit, produce dumb results. The truly ethi-
cal attorney might be forced by his conscience to evade or ignore
the rule.
The tension between these two perspectives is highlighted by
the codes adopted by state bars, which often seem to be efforts to
eliminate ethical reflection on the part of attorneys. When the
code is not sufficiently clear as to what an attorney should do,
then an ethical opinion can be obtained to provide attorneys addi-
tional guidance and thus avoid most, if not all, ethical reflection.
If we focus on the ABA Model Rule approach to disclosure of
criminal activities planned by a client, the "mouthpiece" approach,
the emphasis is on keeping client secrets, and an exception is cre-
ated for attorneys who believe they must disclose a client's
plans. 45 The exception is optional-the attorney may but need not
reveal a planned crime-and it is limited to serious crimes. This
is one solution to the attorney's dilemma. There is a clear rule of
keeping confidences, and a narrow optional exception for terrible
crimes, and whether or not the attorney exercises his or her op-
tion, for ethical reasons, there has not been a breach of any rule.
There are other approaches that may become less popular be-
cause they do not provide the kind of guidance that attorneys
want in practice. On the question of whether an attorney in Vir-
ginia must disclose that a witness was bribed, a recent Virginia
ethics opinion 46 seems to set up a materiality standard by which
attorneys are to weigh the significance of the bribed testimony. If
the witness is testifying as to a central issue in the case then the
44 Id.
45 See MODEL RuLEs OF PRoFEssIoNAL CoNDucT Rule 1.6 (1992).
46 See Va. State Bar Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1361 (1990).
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bribe should be revealed, but if the witness's paid lies are not cen-
tral to the outcome, the bribe need not be revealed. This situation
does not involve confidentiality, since a witness is not a client, but
I mention it as an example of a solution to the question of disclo-
sure duties that places a responsibility on attorneys to make an
assessment of what makes sense in a particular situation, and to
do what is right for the law.
In the context of the duty of confidentiality, we could adopt a
rule that a client's plan to commit a crime must be revealed if the
crime is serious, perhaps if it will result in physical harm or sub-
stantial financial loss, but small tax and traffic and hunting law
violations need not be revealed. The attorney could then decide
whether his or her client's act was serious or trivial.
A different solution, one that also places responsibility on an
attorney, was suggested in a Virginia legal ethics opinion that a
client's stated plan to commit a crime must be revealed, even if the
plan is contingent upon a series of events "which may or may not
occur," if a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer would con-
clude that the client really intended to commit the crime "should
the conditions precedent take place."47 Simply by introducing such
distinctions, when the rule in Virginia is that a stated crime must
always be revealed, the ethics committee created an exception
that could be expanded to permit an assessment of the sincerity of
clients who claim to have abandoned a planned crime. For exam-
ple, the rule could require that a plan to commit a crime must be
revealed, even if the client agrees to abandon the plan, if a reason-
ably prudent and competent lawyer would conclude that the client
had not really abandoned the plan. This solution responds to Pro-
fessor Shaffer's concern that we are playing games if we say that a
client can undo his plan for a moment and relieve his or her attor-
ney from the duty to disclose, even if the attorney does not believe
the client.4
Both of these solutions place responsibilities on an attorney to
decide whether a crime is serious or to decide whether the client is
being truthful, so they both carry the risk that an attorney may be
wrong. That is, in an ethics violation hearing or a civil trial for
47 See Va. State Bar Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1355 (1990).
48 See ABA/BNA LAWYER'S MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCT 901:4604, Mass. Op. 90-
2 (1990).
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lawyer liability to third parties, the lawyer who made a bad as-
sessment may be punished or found liable for that assessment.
In Tucson in the Spring of 1992, a class of 17,000 investors sued
for treble damages totalling $1.2 billion when a Linclon Savings
and Loan institution failed. The bank's directors were joined as
defendants with the accountants and the law firm of Jones, Day,
Reavis & Pogue ("Jones, Day"). Although most of the other de-
fendants settled, Jones, Day went to trial, presumably to protect
its assets and its image. But after three days of testimony, includ-
ing testimony from a former associate who mentioned backdating
of corporate resolutions and borrowing authorizations, Jones, Day
settled for $24 million. Richard Pogue, a named partner of the
firm, said he did not want a jury of nonlaywers to decide his part-
ners' fates.4 9 As laypersons they might not understand the tension
between the fiduciary relationship, wherein a client must be able
to disclose everything and a lawyer must be trustworthy and capa-
ble of preserving secrets, and the duty to stay within the bounds of
the law. This is reminiscent of Carl Llewelyn's dream that the
Uniform Sales Act would always be litigated before a merchant
jury who understood business customs. 50 Should we feel sorry for
attorneys whose ethical decisions, made while walking the tight-
rope between confidentiality and disclosure duties, result in an ac-
cusation of participation in client misconduct?
Let us look again at the Virginia Code and the rule that all
plans to commit a crime, any crime, must be disclosed if the client
does not agree to abandon those plans.51 This rule eliminates the
need for an attorney to make a determination of the materiality or
seriousness of the crime. It also eliminates the need for the attor-
ney to determine if the client is telling the truth. If the client
states an intention and refuses to abandon that intention, the duty
to disclose arises. This becomes the rule in fraud cases as well,
since DR 4-101(C)(3) allows disclosure of client fraud on a third
party only when it is clearly established, and DR 4-101 (D)(2) re-
quires disclosure of fraud on a tribunal only when it is clearly es-
49 See Gail Diane Cox, Just Why Did Jones, Day Settle?, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 13, 1992, at 3,
50.
50 See Dennis M. Patterson, Good Faith, Lender Liability, and Discretionary Accelera-
tion: Of Llewyllyn, Wittgenstein, and the Uniform Commercial Code, 68 TEX. L. REv. 169,
203 (1989).
51 VA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 4-101(D) (1992).
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tablished. You might think that the term "clearly established" re-
quires some assessment on the part of the attorney, but according
to recent legal ethics opinions, a fraud is clearly established only if
the client acknowledges the fraud to the attorney.5 2 Without such
an acknowledgement, there is no fraud to report, even if the attor-
ney is suspicious. Recall Professor Shaffer's formulation that
when rules generally do not guide us, the morals around and
under the rules might. Here, the state bar ethics committee, upon
realization that a rule containing the words "clearly established"
does not provide sufficient guidance, gave us an interpretation
that creates another rule, namely that we can refer to the client's
own words to establish a fraud on third parties or the courts.
My point is that in Virginia, we have a clear rule and clarity is
its virtue. It may be ethically impoverished, and likely to be
avoided, but it is objective. In Ross Perot's terminology, it is a
"slam-dunk."
From the point of view of those who want to be morally respon-
sible attorneys, the Virginia rule does not make sense. Why
should I breach my client's trust and make her angry by reporting
her admission of persistent fishing without a license, while failing
to report her clear intention to kill the game warden simply be-
cause it was not clearly stated or because she promised, without
any sincerity in her voice, not to do it? If that example sounds too
farfetched, why should I breach my client's trust and make him
angry by reporting his acknowledged failure to renew a septic
tank permit, while failing to report his misrepresentations in ne-
gotiations over the sale of his house because he refused to ac-
knowledge the fraud, that is, because he thinks he is just being a
good salesperson?
But from the point of view of an attorney who senses that soci-
ety is ready to sacrifice a little confidentiality for a little more
whistle-blowing by attorneys, and who senses that courts are will-
ing to impose liability on attorneys who hide client misconduct,
the clarity of the Virginia rule is especially attractive. The price of
moral responsibility is going up, and when your livelihood, your
family's future, your law firm's fate, and your malpractice insur-
ance premiums are at stake, you just might appreciate a simple,
52 See Va. State Bar Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1347 (1990); Va.
State Bar Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1367 (1990).
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objective rule of ethics.
The Wisconsin rule on attorney disclosure of a client's intended
crime or fraud seems to be an exemplary approach to this tension
between clear rules and moral responsibility. In Wisconsin, if you
have reasonable doubt about a client's intention to commit a crime
or fraud, you can either report the wrongful conduct or not with-
out violating the Ethics Code.53 This framework lets the attorney
decide, and then seems to promise the attorney that the code will
not be used against him or her in a third-party liability suit. But
the nervous, suspicious, and paranoid Wisconsin attorney will
read the Wisconsin rule more carefully. What if one's doubt is not
found to be reasonable by a jury that is not sympathetic toward
lawyers? Who wants that kind of responsibility? Are there any
job openings in the state of Virginia?
Although I have probably borrowed far too much from Professor
Shaffer, I will go one step further and say, in Professor Shaffer's
terminology, that the narrative under and around the Virginia
rule is a story of sympathy for the plight of attorneys. The barely
hidden assumption behind the Virginia rule, and the ethics opin-
ions interpreting it, is that attorneys have enough problems,
enough burdens, without requiring that they make ethical judg-
ments. The practice of law is simply too dangerous, and the price
of subjectivity too high, to make independent assessments. The
moral of the story is that bright-line rules, even if arbitrary, are to
be preferred over potentially costly ethical judgments about the
line between confidentiality and disclosure duties.
The characters in this story are not unlike Joseph K., the cen-
tral character in Kafka's The Trial.5 4 The legal system in which
Joseph K is caught is full of hidden traps, surprises, and absurdi-
ties. Perhaps some attorneys view the rules of ethics and their
use in malpractice cases as unpredictable-just when you're keep-
ing client secrets, you find out that you should have been report-
ing your client; just when you report a client, you find out that you
should have been preserving secrets. The law firm across town to
which you regularly sent business is now suing you; all the tricks
that you learned about how to make a witness sing are now being
53 See ABA/BNA LAWYER'S MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 901:9110, Wis. Op. E-89-
9 (1989).
54 FRANz KAFKA, THE TRIAL (William & Edwin Muir trans. 1937).
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used against you; and the enterprise of legal ethics around and
under the rules is the least of your worries.
Sympathy for today's attorney, however, implies a certain
marginalization, or trivialization, of legal ethics as the exercise of
moral judgments beyond the rules of professional responsibility.
If we sympathize with the attorney who is faced with a shifting
line between confidentiality and disclosure duties, and who is at
the same time faced with liability for his or her own line-drawing,
then we might forgive the attorney for wanting a clear rule even if
it is ethically bankrupt. In our sympathy however, we will join
those who think that the legal ethics enterprise is old-fashioned,
almost sentimental, and in any event too expensive to take
seriously.
If I wanted to conclude in a manner that might be seen as crass
and cynical, I would say that if you want attorneys to make ethical
judgments, then make sure that attorneys don't suffer profes-
sional liability for bad judgments. But I will not so conclude, pri-
marily because that would reduce the discipline of professional re-
sponsibility to professional formalities.
Instead, I conclude that the enterprise of legal ethics faces a
new challenge. When we assert that the current rules cannot gov-
ern our moral lives, we will be met with a request for more rules.
We will be asked for new rules to protect attorneys from each
other, from creative claims of unethical conduct and from clever
jury arguments. The State of Virginia has given us one such rule.
It solves the problem of inconsistent ethical judgments but it
leaves us with the problem of no room for ethical judgments.
There is no room for ethics in the life of an attorney who feels
bound by his malpractice insurance carrier to follow the letter of
the Virginia Code. The challenge to those who work in the field of
legal ethics is to provide a framework for discussion of attorney
responsibility in the face of the trends toward expansive disclo-
sure duties and third-party liability-two trends that I have iden-
tified as not encouraging to ethical discourse.
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